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Upon Information
and Belief
We feel extremely fortunate to be able to present in this issue
reproductions of five lithographs by William Sharp. Mr. Sharp has
worked for a long time as a newspaper staff artist and most of his assignments were at the New York Supreme Court, where press photographers
are often barred. All of his prints are satirical notes on the various
officials, defendants and culprits he found there, and it is satire of the
first water. His line wanders around a face or profile to suddenly bash
in the chin or tweak its nose, so that by the time Sharp has finished you
know both the subject and what the artist thinks of him. His similarity
to Daumier is mostly in subject matter; his art is his own-and the
world's. It is human. We know that you will enjoy and chuckle over
these prints as we have. The original lithographs may be purchased
from the artist, whose address is 6620 108th Street, Forest Hills, Long
Island, New York. The price is ten dollars each.
In our.October issue we published an article by Graham Susman,
Validity of the Colorado Assignment Act, in which Mr. Susman criticized a dictum appearing in McKelvey v. Striker, which was decided by
the Colorado Supreme Court on August 25, 1941, and at that time not
officially reported. The statement by the court was this: "Had the
debtor proceeded under the statutory assignment act, the results might
have been different." It was Mr. Susman's position that the state assignment act had become inoperative because of the federal bankruptcy act
and that, therefore, the implication springing from this dictum would
probably not be followed if the matter were presented directly to the
court.
In order that Mr. Susman and your editors be not accused of barking up the wrong tree, it should be noted that, subsequent to the publication of Mr. Susman's article, the court of its own motion amended its
previous opinion by striking the sentence quoted above. The sentence
appears in the Pacific Reporter advance sheets* but will not appear in
the Colorado Reports.
Which makes us all very happy, because it proves something which
we had always suspected, namely, to-wit and viz., that at least one
member of the Supreme Court reads DICTA.
*116 P. (2d) 921, at 922.

313

Three Years of the
New Rules
By J. FOSTER SYMES*
During the last few years the American people have been suddenly
awakened to their unpreparedness for war and we, are all witnesses to
the calamitous consequences thereof. We have spontaneously firmly
resolved to prepare for war.
The time has come also for a like awakening by the members of
our profession to our unpreparedness to discharge our present day responsibilities, to our unpreparedness for peace and the consequences therecf.
A civilization may be destroyed by unpreparedness for peace, as well as
for war, and its possibility is indicated by the absence of a satisfactory,
peaceful means of settling disputes and the administration of justice.
It is this that in other countries has caused millions of people to
choose to go to war and use primitive man's method of settling disputes
rather than civilized methods. It is this unpreparedness for peace, evidenced by the absence of enlightened leadership such as our profession
has heretofore been able to provide, that has caused many millions of
people to voluntarily destroy their long established institutions and
voluntarily surrender their liberties. People never give up their liberties
but under some delusion, and people never act under a delusion save
when enlightened leadership is lacking.
But while the lay citizen owes something to the public, far greater
is the obligation of the lawyer, because obligations to the public are to
be measured by ability and opportunity to serve, and the public interest
has the right to exact services in proportion to meet the exaction just as
the government collects taxes in accordance with the ability to pay.
Ever since rules of conduct were adopted by ccmmunities, the lawyer
has been of great and exceptional service to the public. When called
upon he has always given of his time and learning, without money and
without price. And no member of our profession looks back upon those
services, characterized by wisdom and self sacrifice, without a feeling of
professional pride.
But the days that have gone carried no greater responsibility than
the days that are to come, for the solution of every conceivable problem
of moment to the citizen at this time requires a knowledge of the law
and the training which enables us to adjust well known legal principles
to our new industrial, social and economic conditions.
The members of the bar are under the constant duty of improving
the administration of justice as well as the development of the substan*Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.
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tive law in all its branches. The procedural or adjective law deals with
the functions of the court and the creation of more or less arbitrary rules
or statutes. Any improvement in this department of our jurisprudence
is dependent upon the conscientious efforts of courts and lawyers, who
are too inclined to be satisfied with any existing system of procedural
rules.
The history of our profession offers many examples indicating that
we have recognized our duty to bring about reforms designed to adapt
the law to new industrial and social conditions.
The adoption of the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938
constituted a noteworthy epoch in the history of law reform ranking in
importance with the abandonment of common law pleading in England
in 1834 and the adoption of a simplified procedure in that country in
1875.
It was the purpose of the drafters of the new rules of procedure to
simplify, rather than complicate the proper administration of justice.
And, as was stated in Venn-Severin Machine Company v. John Kiss
Sons Textile Mills, Inc.:'
"The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are based on the theory
of a rather general form of pleading. They employ simplicity,
conciseness and directness, and technical forms are eschewed. The
requirement of consistency is done away with and inconsistent
claims are allowed. All refinements of pleading are subordinated
to one aim: the achievement of substantial justice, and courts are
charged to interpret pleadings in that spirit."2
Anyone who has followed the fortunes of the new rules during
these first three years that have elapsed since their adoption must reach
the conclusion that both the federal court and the bar have accepted the
spirit and purpose of the new procedure. Like all other reforms, however,
their path was beset with pitfalls.
First, there was the possibility that the new rules might be destroyed in a bog of technical decisions, of which the New York Code of
Civil Procedure stands out as a horrible example of what may eventually happen to a simple practice code. However, disinterested critics
agree the courts have not exhibited any tendency of this nature.
The second danger confronted by the new procedure was the possibility that such variations might gradually arise in the determination
and application of the rules in eighty-five separate districts, as to cause a
departure from the uniformity sought by the framers and eventually
lead to eighty-five varieties of procedure. But so far there is no indication
of this.
'2F.
R.D. 4 (D. N. J. 1941).
2
Ibid. at 5.
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One question that has actually arisen is, whether the Conformity
Act is still in effect and may be enforced as auxiliary to the new rules.
The act granting power to the Supreme Court to draft rules of civil
procedure clearly repeals the Conformity Act and the new rules must
be regarded as the sole guide to federal civil procedure, except, of course,
as to matters which are excluded from the operation of the rules in
express terms.
In order to assist in the attainment of the chief objective; that is,
brevity and simplicity of pleading, forms are included in the appendix.
A question that early arose was what constitutes a sufficient averment
of negligence. Form 9, denominated Complaint for Negligence, is somewhat as follows: First, an allegation of jurisdiction, and second, that
on June 1, 1936, in a public highway called Boylston Street in Boston,
Massachusetts, defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against
plaintiff, who was then crossing said highway. Third, as a result plaintiff was thrown down and had his leg broken and was otherwise injured,
was prevented from transacting his business, suffered great pain of body
and mind and incurred expenses for medical attention and hospitalization in the sum of one thousand dollars. Wherefore plaintiff demands
judgment against defendant in the sum of ten thousand dollars and costs.
You will observe the form contains no statement as to the character
of any negligent acts or omissions on the part of the defendant and
doubt has been expressed as to whether it contains a sufficient statement
of a cause of action. This identical form has been the subject of litigation which has resolved all doubts as to its sufficiency. In Hardin v.
Interstate Motor Freight System,3 Judge Nevin held a mere general
charge of negligence without specification sufficient, and that allegations
of a petition in the nature of specifications of negligence, in addition to
general allegation of negligence, would be stricken on motion.
A more authoritative interpretation of the rule is found in Sierocinski v.E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.:4
"A plaintiff need not plead evidence. He 'sets forth a claim
for relief' when he makes 'a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. (Rule 8 (a) (2) ).' -5
Let us next turn to the rule concerning contributory negligence,
about which there was considerable doubt as to how to plead it under
the new rules. Rule 8, sub-section (c), as you may recall, lists contributory negligence as one of several defenses which must be pleaded affirmatively. It has always been the rule in the federal courts that in a
negligence case the burden of pleading and establishing negligence is on
'26 F. Supp. 97 (S. D. Ohio 1939).
4103 F. (2d) 843 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939).
lbd. at 843.
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defendant. In some states, New York and Illinois for example, the
absence of contributory negligence must be pleaded by the plaintiff and
proved as part of his prima facie case.
In April, 1938, a few months after the new rules became effective,
the Supreme Court decided Erie R. R. Company v. Tompkins," which
has become a leading case. It holds, as you all know, that on all questions of substantive law the federal courts are bound to administer the
law of the state, irrespective of whether it is statutory or common law.
So when the federal courts had this question of contributory negligence
to deal with they found in a few states, such as New York and Illinois,
for example, the opposite doctrine prevailed and the question was, were
the federal courts required to disregard this rule and require the plaintiff
to establish the absence of contributory negligence as part of his case.
In a well-considered case, Francis v. Humphrey, 7 Judge Wham held:
"Now each federal court must follow the substantive law of
the state where the particular court is located or of the state where
the action arose, as settled and declared by the courts of that state.
"My conclusion is that the absence of contributory negligence
is made an essential part of plaintiff's cause of action by the substantive law of Illinois and this substantive rule, declared by the
courts of Illinois, must be recognized and followed by the federal
courts. Being substantive law, neither the Congress nor the Supreme Court has power to declare it to be other than the courts of
Illinois have established it nor to undermine or destroy it by procedural requirements. ' '8
Likewise the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Sampson v. Channel9 holds that contributory negligence is a matter of substantive law
governed by the applicable state law. This solution is entirely reasonable
and consistent with Erie R. R. Company v. Tompkins.
Whether the defense of the statute of limitations, laches, contributory negligence and res adjudicata should be set forth affirmatively in
the answer, or may be raised by motion to dismiss when the defect appears on the face of the pleading, is a disputed question. There are
plenty of authorities on both sides.
The new Colorado code has adopted the federal rules almost word
for word, including rule 8, sub-division (c), thus affirming what appears
to have been the Colorado rule that contributory negligence must be
pleaded as a defense.
6304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. ed. 1188, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938).

'25
F. Supp. 1 (E. D. Ill. 1938).
8
Ibid. at 3 and 5.

p110 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 1st, 190), cert. den. 310 U. S. 650, 60 S. Ct.
1099, 84 L. ed. 1415 (1940).
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One of the most revolutionary provisions of the new rules is pretrial procedure, a device based directly upon what in England has been
known as "summons for directions," and introduced in the local courts
in Detroit previous to its incorporation in the federal code. Experience
with it had also been highly successful in Boston, where it was introduced
for the purpose of, and succeeded in breaking the jam and speeding the
disposition of a very overcrowded docket. In my court it has been a
matter of ordinary routine, adapted to most every type of case, and now
being extended to non-jury cases. The object of the rule, of course, is
to require the parties before trial to disclose all legal and factual issues
which they intend to raise at the trial, except those involving privilege
or impeaching matter. This is most graphically illustrated in a recent
case in the federal court of Oregon. I refer to Burton v. Wyerhaeuser
Timber Company.10
That was an action to recover damages for a disabling acid burn
on the plaintiff's hand. At the trial a witness for the defendant was
allowed to demonstrate before the jury that a small amount of muriatic
acid placed on his hand and allowed to remain for several minutes could
be washed off without any damage. This was held to be error, because
neither the court nor opposing counsel was apprized either at the pretrial hearing or in advance of trial that such a demonstration was contemplated, thus depriving the plaintiff of the opportunity to meet the
demonstration by evidence or demonstration to the contrary, and because
it deprived opposing counsel and the court of the opportunity to check,
or have checked, the acid used for the demonstration to determine whether
it was the same in kind, quality, and strength as the acid which the plaintiff contended caused his burn. For this reason the trial court held the
plaintiff was prevented from having a fair trial, and on its own initiative,
in accordance with rule 59 (d), ordered a new trial. The court also
observed that the fact that plaintiff was burned by sulphuric acid, and
not muriatic acid, should have been disclosed at the pre-trial hearing,
and failure so to do was contrary to the spirit of the new rules that
surprise should be eliminated as a trial tactic.
At pre-trial I require counsel to state his facts and theory, name witnesses he will call and make a general statement of what each witness
will testify to. All questions in respect to documentary evidence are
discussed and agreed to if possible, and physical examination and expert
testimony agreed upon. I never attempt to force a settlement. It is not
necessary, because the attorney who has a weak case is fully apprized of
it, and the case is soon settled. After all this, an order and stipulation
is drawn by the court from its notes and submitted to counsel, and if
agreed upon becomes an order and part of the record. No stenographer
is in attendance. It has been held in Silvera v. Broadway Department
101

F. R. D. 571 (D. Ore. 1941).

DICTA

319

Store11 that under pre-trial procedure the court can dismiss when the
admitted facts and proof show no cause of action.
In this district pre-trial conferences have been held in ninety-two
cases. Fbrty were disposed of after pre-trial and the trial of the balance
greatly shortened. I have been rather strict in granting motions for
bills of particulars, discovery, and'so on, and have advised counsel that
the information desired will be made fully available to them without
trouble at the pre-trial conference, if they will be patient and wait. In
Frank v.Geisyl 2 it was held that limitations of issues at pre-trial conference bars consideration of other questions on appeal.
One outstanding feature of the new rules is the treatment of depositions and discovery. The new practice provides five methods, depositions or examinations before trial, interrogatories, production and inspection of documents and other objects, requests for admissions and
physical and mental examinations.13
The object of discovery is to afford a means to secure evidence which
the moving party needs in support of his case or defense, and also for
procuring information which may be inadmissable as such at the trial,
but which may be of material help in preparing for trial; consequently,
the moving party may take depositions not only for the purpose of obtaining evidence on issues on which he has the burden of proof, but also
to inquire into matters relating to the case of his opponent, and the mere
fact the matters regarding which discovery is sought happens to be within
the knowledge of the moving party is no objection to taking of the
deposition of the adverse party, or filing interrogatories in respect thereto.
The rules contemplate a liberal discovery by all parties, and it is
held the test of relevancy in a motion for discovery is not as strict as
that which governs the admissibility of evidence upon a trial.14
The general objection that the interrogatories constitute a fishing
expedition is now of no avail. 15 It has also been held that one party
should not be allowed to compel another to make research, compilation
of data or statistics for him, which he might equally as well make for
himself.' "
On the other hand, these rules may not be used in such a manner
as to penalize the diligent and place a premium on laziness. They were
not intended to be made the vehicle by which one litigant can make use
of his opponent's preparation for trial.
135 F. Supp. 625 (S. D. Calif. 1940>.
12 117F. (2d) 122 (C. C. A. 9th. 1941).
"Rules
26 to 37, inclusive.
"4 Lewis v. United Air Lines Transportation Co., 27 F. Supp. 946 (D. Conn.
1939).
"Laverett v. Continental Briar Pipe Co.. 1 F. Supp. 80 (E. D. N. Y. 1938):
Boysell Co. v. Hale, 30 F. Supp. 255 (S. D. Tenn. 1939).
'"Coca Cola Co. v. Dixi-Coco Laboratories, 30 F. Supp. 275, 279 (D. Md. 193.9).
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The reasons for all this are obvious. Very often it is not sufficient
to have knowledge of the facts, but it also may be necessary to transform
them into such shape as to render them admissible as evidence. Likewise
it is within the spirit of the new rules to diminish the time and expense
of trials by ascertaining in advance to what extent facts will be admitted
by the opposing party.
Requirements for admissions have a definite object, for if the party
on whom the requirement is made is familiar with the facts, or has the
means of ascertaining them, there is no reason why he should not admit
the truth under the threat of being required to recompense the adverse
party for the expense incurred in proving the facts at the trial, the theory
being that a lawsuit should not be conducted as a controversy at arm's
length, or a game of chess in which the most skillful player wins.
A recent case on this subject is Walsh v. Connecticut Mutual Life
Insurance Company."7 This was an action on a life policy for double
indemnity for accidental death. The defenses were that the insured had
sustained personal injuries and had used alcoholic stimulants to excess
and had been treated therefor, contrary to statements made in the applications for the policy, and that death resulted from alcoholism and disorderly conduct. The wife, bringing the suit, was ordered to answer a
request for admission as to whether or not her husband suffered a fracture
of the jaw, the court holding such an admission was not testimony, was
not a confidential communication, and was solely for the purpose of the
action; that it did not constitute an admission by her for any other purpose, and might not be used against her in any other proceedings. As
the court points out, the case illustrates the wisdom of the new rules,
because if the plaintiff answered affirmatively the defendant's request for
admissions, the defendant would be entitled to a judgment without
delay, and further, that a party should be required to deny or admit the
truth of any relevant matters set forth in the pleadings that otherwise
would delay the trial and cause the defendant unnecessary expense.
Students have doubtless discovered there is a sharp difference between bills of particulars in code states and bills of particulars under the
new rules. Under the codes, bills of particulars are ordered after issue
is joined, for the purpose of furnishing information necessary to prepare
for trial, while under the new rules an application for a bill of particulars
lies only before answer is served, the purpose of such relief being to obtain
only such information as is required by the moving party to enable him
to plead, while information needed in the preparation for trial is secured
by interrogatories.
One of the important innovations in the new rules is the so-called
third party practice, which makes it possible to avoid circuity of action
26 F. Supp. 566 (E. D. N.Y. 1939).
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by enabling a defendant to bring in as a third party defendant, either a
person who is liable over to him on the plaintiff's claim, or who is originally liable to the plaintiff. In connection with this a vital question
arises: Is it necessary that there exist an independent ground of federal
jurisdiction for third party complaint; that is, if the original suit is based
upon diversity of citizenship, must there be a like diversity between the
defendant and the third party defendant. This question turns on
whether a third party proceeding is ancillary to the main suit or is to be
considered as an independent proceeding.
No court of appeals has passed upon this question as yet. Most of
the district courts, however, have adopted the view that a third party
proceeding is ancillary to the main action and does not require an independent ground of federal jurisdiction. To illustrate: In Carter Oil
Company v. Wood"' a non-resident grantee of an oil lease brought suit
to restrain resident defendants from interfering with the grantee's rights.
The defendants filed a counterclaim against the grantee and his grantor
alleging that the grantor was not the owner of the property and that
the grantee's title was held merely to secure the defendants' indebtedness,
which they were willing to pay. It was held that the grantor was properly made the defendant in the counterclaim, and that the district court
had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the counterclaim, notwithstanding absence of diversity of citizenship between the original defendant
and the grantor. Where the jurisdiction attaches on the filing of the
original bill, any cross-bill or counterclaim looking to a complete adjudication of the issues presented by the complaint rests on the original jurisdiction and is not affected by the citizenship of the respective parties,
even as to third parties brought in by virtue of rules authorizing such
action.
Whitmire v. Partin19 was an action for personal injuries resulting
from an automobile accident, jurisdiction being based on diversity of
citizenship. There it was held that defendant might bring in the driver
of the car in which the plaintiff was riding at the time of the accident as
a third-party defendant, although the latter and the plaintiff were citizens of the same state. An independent basis of jurisdiction is not necessary to support a third-party proceeding.2
Rule 43, relating to evidence, provides that the federal court shall
apply the federal or state law of evidence, whichever happens to be the
most liberal at the moment. Rulings on questions of evidence are made
in the course of the trial, so very few opinions are rendered on this rule
2'30 F. Supp. 875 (E. D. Il1. 1940).
"5 Fed. Rules Serv. 14a. 513 (E. D. Tenn. 1941).
'See also Sklar v. Hayes v. Singer, 1 F. R. D. 594 (E. D. Pa. 1940) : Bossard v.
McGwinn, 27 F. Supp. 412 (W. D. Pa. 1939) : Kravas v. Great Atlantic VdPacific Tea
Co., 28 F. Supp. 66 (W. D. Pa. 1939) ; Satink v. Holland Township, 28 F. Supp. 67
(D. N. J. 1939).
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by trial courts, and the circuit courts of appeal have not yet been called
upon to construe this new rule. It will be observed, however, that the
rule merely enlarges the rules as to admissibility of evidence. It does not
say what is excluded, but only that which is to be admitted under either
the federal decisions or the statute or decisions of the state in which the
trial is had.
An interesting question arose in Texas in Elliott v. United Employers Casualty Company.2 ' The suit against the casualty company
was to recover advances made by plaintiff to a third party, which plaintiff
claimed the defendant casualty company assumed to repay. Judgment
was for the defendant. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial and moved
to take the depositions of two officers of the defendant company, to be
used on the hearing on the motion, alleging that the two officers left the
jurisdiction of the court, evaded service of subpoenas, and thus avoided
testifying at the trial. The court held the charge that officers of the
defendant corporation evaded process was sufficient to require the court
in some manner to ascertain what their testimony would have been if
present at the trial; that under rule 43 (e), and probably under subdivision 2 of 59 (a), depositions on motion for new trial might be taken.
Except for a few lawyers oblivious to the fact that the function of
the courts is to administer justice, rather than to develop an artificial and
useless science, the new rules have met with universal approval. In addition to possessing the virtues of uniformity, they constitute the quintessence of simplicity. They have cast into oblivion much abstruse and
laborious learning dealing with forms of action, refinement of pleadings,
joinder of parties, causes of action, and other similar topics too numerous
to mention.
Proof that the new procedure is satisfactory is indicated by the
Supreme Court in the new Orders in Bankruptcy, which provide that
the rules shall be followed as nearly as may be in proceedings under the
bankruptcy act. Later the same court made them applicable to copyright
suits. The greatest tribute, however, that has been paid to this reform
is that they have been adopted in several states, including Colorado.
This last fact was one of the principal causes of the recent receipt by the
Colorado Bar Association of the American Bar Association Award of
Merit.
It is not too optimistic, I trust, to imagine that in the not too distant future a uniform, simple procedure in all state and federal courts
will be adopted. When that consummation is reached, inconsequential
controversies over points of pleading, practice and procedure, which delay
the solution of substantial rights, and which are of no importance to
the litigants, will be largely eliminated.'
'35 F. Supp. 781 (S.D. Tex. 1940).
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Frederick H. Wood Speaks to Denver Bar

Association
The speaker at the luncheon meeting of the Denver Bar Association
on November 3, 1941, was Frederick H. Wood of New York City.
Mr. Wood is a member of the firm of Cravath, de Gersdorff, Swaine &
Wood and is one of America's great trial lawyers. He has argued many
cases before the United States Supreme Court, among them the Schechter
chicken case (which declared the N. R. A. unconstitutional), the gold
clause case, the O'Fallon rate case, the Carter case and the Socony Vacuum oil case. Recently he successfully defended the motion picture
industry in St. Louis against a charge of violating the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Mr. Wood's subject was "The Lawyer in War Time." It was
his opinion that the United States should give such aid and take such
steps as might be necessary at the proper time-and he stated that he
would not presume to say when that might be-to insure the defeat of
Hitlerism.
Concerning those who have voiced fears of the dangers to out
American way of life, Mr. Wood said, "Those who assert that we are
on the verge of national suicide must base their conclusions either upon
the belief that the right of free speech and other civil liberties guaranteed
by the Constitution cannot survive the stress of war conditions, or that
our free economy will be succeeded by some form of national socialism,
or both."
Mr. Wood pointed out that some curtailment of civil liberties had
occurred during most of the war crises through which this country has
passed but that in each case those restrictions were removed as soon as
the emergency ended. "I am convinced," said he, "that unless the
United States Supreme Court backs up on what it has done during the
last twenty years in clarifying the problem of free speech, there will be
little danger of a destruction of our liberties in the present war."
Of the second fear Mr. Wood recalled that during the last war the
government exercised a degree of control over our domestic economy and
daily lives which, if exercised in peace times, would be destructive both
of our free economy and our personal liberties. All these powers, however, were laid down at the close of the war.
While the powers exercised by the government during World War I
were greater than any now being exercised or which have been sought,
Mr. Wood was of the opinion that our national defense program will
require the exercise of governmental powers at least equal to those then
exercised. "And," said Mr. Wood, "it must be admitted that we are
in greater danger of losing our free economy now than we were then.
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While before the last war the trend everywhere was toward democracy
and free institutions, the trend since has been in the other direction."
The greatest cause for apprehension, according to the speaker, is
apt to come from those who will seek a "planned" economy which,
according to Mr. Wood, is but another name for national socialism, and
from those high in the administration who will advocate the commercialization of war plants to be operated as "yardsticks" after the war.
"It is better," he said, "to write off such investments as a part of the cost
of war than to destroy our system of free enterprise by the pursuit of such
a course.

"We should not, however, withhold from the government and its
executive branch those powers necessary to the conduct of national affairs during the continuation of the present war for fear they may not
be surrendered at its close, any more than we did in 19 17. But," said
Mr. Wood, "we can insist that all grants of power be limited to the
duration of the war and that under guise of its requirements, no legislation be enacted affecting either our domestic economy or our personal
liberties that does not automatically end with it."
A capacity audience was present at the meeting and Mr. Wood
received a rising ovation at the end of his speech.

"Work for the Night Is Coming!"
(a modern legal question)
To Work or Not to Work-that is the question.
How Long to Work-that's another question.
How Much Is My Work Worth?--that is one more question.
Who Can Make Me Quit Work?--that is still a fourth
question.
Do I have to "cool off" before I quit work?-that's sure a
new question.
Whom do I have to work with?-that's a perplexing question.
Fellow Barristers:
Blackstone, Coke &4 Storey won't help you answer these
questions for your clients, but the all-star cast at the Fall Legal
Institute of the Denver Bar Association will positively provide
the pertinent, pat precedents that will peremptorily, perfectly,
permanently, perspicuously and persuasively solve your paying
patrons' personal personnel problems.
SAVE THE DATE-Thursday, December 18, from 4 to
4 and 7:30 to 10 P. M.
(Worth watching and waiting for)
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Learned Discussion

Original lithographs of the above and the following
reproductions may be procured from the artist at $10.00 each.
The sizes are as follows:
LEARNED DISCUSSION -----103/4"xl 212"
NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH-- I0"xl O/ 2 "

THE OTHER WOMAN ---------......-9"xl 3"
ORDER IN THE COURT ......
101/"x1312"
IF YOUR HONOR PLEASE ....
9, 2 "x132"
Your order should be addressed to MR. WILLIAM SHARP,
6620 108th St., Forest Hills, Long Island, New York.
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Nothing But the Truth

The Other Woman
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Order in the Court

U
If Your Honor Please

The Minnequa
Bank Robbery
By IVOR 0. WINGREN*
A lonely, shabbily dressed woman sat on the edge of an old iron
bed in a cheap rooming house in Los Angeles. Her fingers moved idly
through a large assortment of postage stamps, the only memento of her
marriage. Most of the stamps were of large denominations;, few could
be used on letters she would write. Many were air mail stamps of the
first issues, now out of print and collectors' items. But her thoughts
were not on the stamps.
The expression on her face was hard as she recalled the five thousand
dollars she had given to that shyster i~n San Francisco. It hadn't been
easy, raising that much money, but no sacrifice was too great, she had
thought, if she could just get her husband out of the pen. She hadn't
much liked the looks of the San Francisco mouthpiece, but he said he
could spring anyone for five G's. It wasn't any of her business, and she
never knew how he did it. She didn't care. All she knew was that a
short time after the money was turned over, her husband was released.
His cellmate had been sprung at the same time.
But her happiness had been short lived. Within a few months her
husband had divorced her and left with his partner and erstwhile cellmate, to go into the automobile business, they had said.
Her thoughts turned to the stamps. They represented the only gift
her husband had ever given her. She recalled the first time she had seen
them. That was in a cottage camp just outside of Birmingham. It was
a little after noon. Her husband and his partner has just returned from
robbing a substation of the Birmingham post office. She could see her
husband now as he tossed his white cap and the stamps an the bed. In
their hurry to get away, she had swept the stamps into her bag, but the
cap had been forgotten.
Then there was the badger game the two men had worked on the
rich merchant in Los Angeles. That job had been good for ten grand.
She berated herself for a fool. It was right after that when her husband
*Of the Denver bar and Assistant United States District Attorney.
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had left her. Why hadn't she turaned them both over to the police then?
Instead he had watched them go, her husband and his convict partner,
forgetting for the moment that she would be utterly alone and penniless.
They had taken all the money; it was just enough to set them up in
business.

Henry Williams, the popular Chrysler-Plymouth automobile dealer,
limped ever so slightly as he walked down the aisle toward the altar in
the little church on the campus of the University of Washington. If
you watched closely, you might have noticed that one foot seemed to
drag as if that leg were just a little too heavy. But this did not affect
the lightness in his heart, for at the altar he was to meet a young and
beautiful undergraduate. She was to become his bride.
Not many people knew that Henry Williams had been a champion
dirt track automobile racer or that he had lost a leg in a crash. So agile
was he that only a few of his friends and employees had noticed the limp
or knew that he wore a wooden leg. The loss of the leg had bothered
him only very slightly, and he was more than compensated for that handicap by the benefit he derived from his racing experience. Because of
it he had been able to make better demonstrations with the fast Chrysler
cars that he sold than could his competitors. His partner, Leonard
Sharkey, was a good demonstrator, too. He had formerly been an
aviator.
After the wedding Henry Williams and his bride went to live in an
attractive white cottage near the university campus. The automobile
business was reasonably good. but the bridegroom was always short of
money. Almost every cent had to be applied to keep creditors from
filing suits. It seemed simply a case of lack of working capital. The
young bride was deeply concerned about the state of her husband's business, but he assured her that the financial pinch was only temporary and
that everything would work out all right. Some people, it seemed, owed
him a large amount of money, and when he collected this, all the creditors would be satisfied in full. Then they would have money to do the
things he had promised her.
It was in the early part of July, 1937, when Williams told his wife
that he had heard from the men who owed him the money. They were
ready to pay, and he and his partner were going to California to make
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the collection. They were going to drive their Chrysler demonstrator
and would be gone only a few days. Down at the agency they put their
best mechanics to work on the car, and when finished, it was tuned up to
perform like the racing cars that Henry Williams had driven before he
lost his leg.
The two partners left Seattle on July 17, and on the morning of
July 20, 1937, they were back at the agency. The men looked tired,
and the car showed the effects of a hard drive. The attendant grumbled
as he washed off the mud and dried bugs. But they had made their
collection. All the employees and creditors of the agency were paid in
full, and the agency prospered.
The bride's happiness was complete. Her husband was kind, considerate and generous, and now they were able to forget all about creditors. It wasn't long until they took a shopping trip to San Francisco,
where she bought a fur coat and other furbelows which delight the heart
of a woman.
Leonard Sharkey bought an airplane, took a vacation, and went
barnstorming in Wyoming. There he crashed and he and his two passengers were killed. But in a way even this was beneficial to Henry
Williams, for now he was the sole owner of the prosperous agency.
At about eleven o'clock in the morning of July 19, 1937, a man
drove a large car slowly down the main street in Pueblo, Colorado. He
was staying abreast of another man who was walking along the sidewalk. The man on the sidewalk was apparently looking for something
in the cars parked along the curb. Suddenly he stopped near a yellow
Ford V-8. There was no one in the yellow car, but the ignition keys
were in the lock. He looked quickly one way and then the other along
the street, then stepped into the Ford, started the motor and drove away
from the curb. In the meantime the driver of the large car bad slowed
up almost to a stop, then as the yellow Ford pulled away from the curb,
both cars moved forward at a leisurely pace. The big car, followed by
the Ford, was driven to the edge of town. There the big car was parked
near a cemetery exactly as anyone might do who wished to decorate the
grave of a loved one. A short time later the yellow Ford was back in
town and parked in front of the Minnequa Bank.
It was the noon hour, and the only employees who had not gone
to lunch were the assistant cashier and two tellers. Suddenly two men
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stepped out of the yellow Ford and hurried into the bank. One had a
pistol in his hand and a green handkerchief over a part of his face. The
other carried a white pillow slip.
"Turn around," the gunman growled to the assistant cashier, "and
reach for the sky." The tellers were commanded to lie face-down on
the floor.
To the assistant cashier, there was something familiar about this
man who menaced him with the gun. He noticed that as the gunman
spoke and the handkerchief moved, a deep crease appeared in the line
from the nose to the mouth. Also there was a peculiar cold glint in the
gunman's eyes. His voice was hard, and his manner highly abusive,
but still the bank officer could not place him. He did not know then
that fourteen years before he had waited on the man behind the green
handkerchief many times.
The gunman's partner jumped through the swinging gate into the
cages and began stuffing bills into the pillow slip. He ordered the assistant cashier to open the safe. In the excitement, the latter was unable to
do so until the third try and then only after a threat that if he failed
again he would have his "brains blown out."
As the gunman's partner scooped currency out of the open safe, a
Negro preacher walked into the bank carrying in his hand a check, the
contribution of his congregation.
"Get down on the floor, you black s - b, and don't you
look up," the gunman shouted.
The preacher dropped to the floor as if he had been shot, the check
fluttering down near the gunman's foot. And the Negro didn't look up,
either. Not only had the gunman ordered him not to, but he wanted to
keep his eye on the check. That was his. He heard the gunman's rough
voice and his abusive language, but his gaze remained on the floor-on
his check and on the gunman's shoes. He noticed that the gunman
teetered back and forth on one foot and that the shoe on that foot was
badly worn at the toe. The other foot and shoe looked just like anyone
else's.
In a few minutes the robbers were gone, and with them went
thirty-nine thousand dollars, tucked in the pillow slip. The alarm was
sounded immediately, and the yellow Ford, with all fingerprints carefully wiped off, was found near the cemetery a short time later. But
there the trail ended.
The FBI submitted many photographs of suspects to the witnesses,
the assistant cashier, the two tellers and the Negro preacher. Sometimes
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one of them would identify a photograph as that of one of the robbers
only to fail to identify the suspect when brought face to face.
Finally in checking convicts who had been released within the past
few years, the FBI discovered that Henry Williams and Leonard Sharkey,
cellmates in the same prison, had bee.n released on the same day. One
had been an automobile racing driver and the other an aviator. In a
routine checkup on these men in Seattle, it was discovered that one of
them limped. The other had been killed while piloting his plane in
Wyoming. Their automobile agency, which had been hard pressed
before July 19, 1937, had suddenly become quite prosperous. With
the post office inspectors, they then called upon Williams' divorced wife
in Los Angeles, the woman he had so ruthlessly abandoned. Her bitterness had not subsided, and she was more than eager to taste the sweet
fruit of revenge, particularly when it could be combined with the added
lure of a reward for the apprehension of the post office robbers. She
gave them the stamps, which were found to check with the robbery in
Birmingham. She told them about the white cap, and the post office
employee who had been robbed remembered the cap and the abusive
language of the robber who wore it.
Here, then, was such a pair as could have robbed the bank.
One morning in November, 1938, Henry Williams left his home
to go to his automobile agency. Within a few hours he was in a showup
box in the King County jail. The Negro preacher saw that Williams'
shoe was worn at the toe like the shoe worn by the robber in the bank.
Later that day, at a hearing before the Commissioner, a newspaper photographer's flashlight bulb exploded near Williams' face. Williams
became startled and angry. The deep crease appeared in his face, and his
voice as he swore took on the rough tone used by the gunman in the
bank. Both the assistant cashier and the preacher were able to identify
him immediately as one of the robbers.
Several months later Henry Williams, whose true name was Henry
William Howard, confessed that he and Leonard Sharkey, whose true
name was William Otis Bashaw, had robbed the Minnequa Bank of
Pueblo on July 19, 1937. After the robbery, they had driven the
yellow Ford to the cemetery, where it was abandoned. Then leaving
Pueblo by a back route, they had driven the rest of the day, all night
and a part of the next morning until they arrived in Seattle, thirteen
hundred miles from the scene of their crime. One slept while the other
drove, and no stops were made except for gasoline, a few candy bars and
a bottle or two of wine, which they drank to keep themselves awake.
Howard was sentenced by Judge Symes to nine years in the pententiary. *
*This story has been condensed from the files in the United States District Attorney's office at Denver, Colorado.
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Pueblo Bar Honors Judge Symes
Judge J. Foster Symes of the federal district court was the guest
of honor at a banquet held on November eighth at Pueblo, where more
than fifty lawyers of the Pueblo Bar Association gathered to tender felicitations and best wishes to the federal jurist, who begins his twentieth
year on the bench. As the principal speaker of the evening, Judge Symes
delivered an address on "Three Years Under the New Rules of Civil
Procedure," which is printed in this issue of DICTA. Wallace W. Platt,
state bar president, related the accomplishments of the Colorado Bar Association which led to the National Award of Merit.
A legal institute was held preceding the banquet devoted to the
subjects of bankruptcy and federal practice. The bankruptcy section
featured short talks about some of the more usual types of practice under
the Chandler Act. Among the speakers were Referees Frank McLaughlin, Charles J. Moynihan and Sperry S. Packard, G. Walter Bowman of
Denver, and J. Gregory Donohue, Vincent Cristiano and John L. Faricy,
all of Pueblo.
Civil matters in the federal courts was the subject of the second
session of the institute. A brief outline of some aspects of federal practice was given by Edward L. Wood and Ivor Wingren, both of Denver.
The institute was planned by the Pueblo Bar Association in conjunction with the state association. Sam Parlapiano of Pueblo presided
over the institute and banquet, and Sperry Packard arranged the institute
on bankruptcy. Entertainment details were supervised by Harry Petersen.

Mandamus and Other Writs
Many Denver lawyers are still following the old procedure of using
the Alternative Writ in mandamus and the old writs in other cases.
This is a lot of needless work as the forms of writs are abolished by
rule 1-06.
Rule 12 (a) provides, "In actions under subdivisions (1) to (4),
inclusive, of rule 106, the court, ex parte, before process issues, may
shorten the time for answer, and thereafter may shorten any of the
periods fixed in these rules."
The procedure is to prepare a complaint and a summons under rule
106 and file the complaint with the clerk, then take the complaint and
the unissued summons to the court.
There you make an oral application to shorten the time for answer,
put that time in the summons instead of the twenty days, attach a copy
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of the order shortening the time to the summons, issue the latter, and
serve copies of the complaint, summons and order.
-Philip ,S. Van Cise.

State Bar Officials Attend New Mexico Meeting
W. W. Platt and R. J. Moses of Alamosa attended the meeting of
the New Mexico State Bar Association, recently held at Roswell. Both
men reported that they enjoyed the meeting and were handsomely entertained by that association. Mr. Platt addressed the New Mexico bar
convention and related the program which the Colorado Bar Association
had followed during the past year. Mr. Moses was the chief speaker at
the meeting of the Junior Bar convention held Saturday noon.

Boulder Bar Discusses New Probate Procedure
A meeting of the Boulder County Bar Asscxiation was held in
Longmont on October 7th with twenty-five present. Judge William E.
Buck of the county court led a discussion on new court rules and new
probate forms.
The regular October meeting was held in Boulder on October 20.
Frank Dolan and Harlan Howlett discussed the application of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 to estate matters. A motion
was passed that it be the well considered opinion of the Boulder County
Bar Association that the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940
does not apply to probate, administration or determination of heirship
proceedings.
p-L. B. Flanders,
Jr.

Insure with
1 A Good Colorado Stock Fire and Automobile
Insurance Company--enjoying its 16th year in
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